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STARE DECISIS, COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES AND
PREDICTABILITY: A PROPOSAL TO CONFRONT THE
REFORM OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
Luis Diego Canseco & Enrique Pasquel*

"Set it down to thyself, as well to create good precedents as to follow
them." Sir Francis Bacon, Essays Of Love.'
"[Stare Decisis] is a maxim among the lawyers that whatever has been
done before, may legally be done again: and therefore they take special
care to record all the decisions formerly made against common justice, and
the general reason of mankind." Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels.2
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I. A NEW REFORM
The reform of the judicial branch has been a constant subject on the
national agenda since the beginning of the Republic of Peru. It has been
the subject of countless pronouncements by intellectuals and noted jurists;
it has enriched the speeches and incited the demagogy of politicians and
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss4/3
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country's leaders; it is commonplace in the frequently unattended
"governmental plans" of political parties during electoral campaigns; and
it has provided an excuse to compromise and weaken the independence of
the judicial branch.
In January 2003, the subject of judicial reform has become relevant
again when the President of the Peruvian Supreme Court of Justice, Dr.
Hugo Sivina Hurtado, read an unprecedented message to the nation that
was widely spread by the media.'
In a speech intended to highlight his intention to lead an integral reform
of the administration ofjustice, the President of the Supreme Court called
attention to "the pompous intervention of those who, having great political
responsibilities within the government, baselessly criticize legal decisions
with the purpose of exacerbating popular discontent and of suggesting the
inability of the Judicial Power to face these situations." 2 He also
emphasized his "firm conviction to recover our institutional space, by
emphasizing autonomy and independence with the object of gaining
respect as a power of state. '
The message offered a particularly interesting and absolutely unedited
approach, which contrasted with what experts on the subject of judicial
reform in Latin America had heard until then. In effect, President Sivina
argued that critics of the performance of the judiciary try "to justify the
necessity of imposing reform . . . from entities distinct from the
judiciary."4 He also stated that "the arguments that criticize the judicial
branch are incoherent and make our work more difficult."5 Both statements
indicated the necessity of promoting reform "from within."
The need for reform "from within" constitutes an extraordinary
affirmation of the independence of powers that formally consecrates our
Constitution. In addition, it supposes a reaction to the fact that "often,
under the clothes or speech of judicial reform formulated and designed
'from outside,' not by judicial authorities themselves, pernicious desires
to intervene with and manipulate the system of justice are uncovered." 6

1. See Hugo Sivina Hurtado, President, Supreme Court of Peru, Message to the Nation (Jan.
2, 2003), availableat http://www.pj.gob.pe/paginas/Mensaje.htm.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See EL COMMERCIO, Aug. 3, 2003, at A2. Months later Doctor Sivina reiterated these
ideas by indicating that any reform from outside is not welcomed. Speech of Order of the president
of the Supreme Court before the SuperiorCourtofJustice of Cusco on May 22, 2003, availableat
http://www.pj.gob.pe/discursocusco.htm.
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President Sivina is correct, because the history of Peru is plagued by
events that confirm that the judicial power enjoys independence only on
paper and is a part of the state that has only been respected in a relative
sense. Although the judicial branch has always been an object of interest
to many of Peru's governments in power, it has never been offered the
resources which would guarantee autonomy. Instead the judicial banch
itself has been treated like a resource. The most pathetic example occurred
during the government of Alberto Fujimori Fujimori (1990-2000). The
corruption was so great that judicial decisions were manipulated from the
offices of the intelligence service. This "well-known secret" was of such
dimensions that the World Bank cancelled a reform operation that it was
developing for Peru.7
For this reason, President Sivina courageously criticized the previous
attempts at reform. He stated that the corruption was not limited to the
judicial branch.8 President Sivina also renewed the issue of temporary
service for judges.9 He commented on the lack of access to justice by a
great number of citizens and he explicitly recognized the problems of
slowness and the violation of procedural norms."0 Also, he emphasized the
reform of the judicial power would be an effort "led by judges."" That is
to say, reform would be launched "from within" and would be structured,
coordinated, and developed by the judiciary itself, "but with strategic
alliances with political sectors and civil society."2
President Sivina is not wrong. Cleaning up begins at home and it serves
no purpose to direct financial aid, human efforts, time, and resources to
something the inhabitants of the home do not want. Nevertheless, it is also
recognized that the cleaning depends on those who visit the house (the
users of the system). In this sense, the President mentioned the creation of
a "National Accord for Justice in which the principles and minimal points
should orient this process of modernization would be defined." 3 In his
7. For an account of the process of reform of that decade, see Mauricio Garcia, La Reforma
de la Administraci6n de Justicia [The Reform of the Justice Administration], in INSTITUTO
PERUANO DE ECONOMiA SERIE ESTUDIOS [Peruvian Institute of the Economy Studies Series] Vol.
199-062. See also Red de Informaci6n Juridica [Legal Information Center], Origen, Iniciativae
Innovacionesde la Reforma Judicialen Per [Origin, Initiative and Judicial Innovations of the
Judicial Reform in Peru], in SISTEMASJUDICIALES, REFORMA Y MODERNIZACION JUDICIAL [Judicial
System, Reformation and Modernization], availableat http://www.cajpe.org.pe/RIJ/ases/reforma/
CE1O-e.HTM.
8. Hugo Sivina Hurtado, supra note 3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Hugo Sivina Hurtado, supra note 3.
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speech he did not offer the content of this accord, but he referenced the
methods of solving the most important problems that plague the
administration of justice.'4 These problems include corruption, slowness,
an absence of independence, a lack of efficiency and logistical support,
and limitations of access to justice. 5 A problem that lamentably does not
explicitly appear in the speech, but that he alludes to, is predictability.
President Sivina's speech was widely spread by the mass media. As
usual, politicians took advantage of the occasion to offer declarations of
a diverse nature. Similarly, experts and leaders of public opinion had a
magnificent opportunity to emphasize their points of view and to construct
alternatives. Also, important sectors of civil society and the business
community put forth their opinions. In summary, a current of extremely
favorable opinion was generated.
Along with the expressions of support arose some voices in which
skepticism of the good intentions of the president of the Supreme Court
was evident. The judicial power always has been the "ugly duckling" of
the national government because of its lack of prestige, inefficiency,
corruption, technical faults and lack of predictability. The perception of
influential public leaders was that the declarations of President Sivina did
not spring from good intentions and that they would not have any practical
desired effect.
The fact is President Sivina's message to the nation did not remain
mere words. In a relatively brief time, a Commission of Magistrates for the
Reconstruction of the Judicial Power was formed. 6 The Commission's
members consisted of the President ofthe Supreme Court, members of that
Court, and members of diverse Superior Courts of the country, and some
judges.17 The commission formed thematic work groups that proposed a
set of reforms for the Office of Judicial Administration, reforms for the
other branches of government, an anticorruption and judicial ethics policy,
reform of penal justice, and reform of civil justice. 8

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. [Agreement of the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru] Jan. 22, 2003 (deciding how to
reconstruct the judicial branch).
17. [Agreement of the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru] Jan. 22, 2003. La Resolucion
Administrative de la Presidencia del Poder Judicial [hereinafter Administrative Resolution of the
Presidency of the Judicial Power] 035-2003-P-PJ (2003), available at http://www.cajpe.org.pe/
RIJ/BASES/REFORMA/035-2003.htm; see also the text of the Lineamientos of the Commission
of Magistrates for the Reconstruction of the Judicial Power, available at http://www.pj.gob.pe/
econstruction/DocumentosBase/LINEAMIENTOS.htm (Document dateless).
18. See Thematic Work Groups, executive information and executive summaries, available
at http://www.pj.gob.pe/Reestructuracion/documentos. htm.
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This analysis and the elaboration of proposals proved to be an
extremely valuable exercise. Unfortunately, the self-imposed deadline
created by the commission expired. 9 Also, a parallel method of
communication was not developed to allow civil society and the political
class to know what was being done at the time. In effect, its work was so
"from within" that it seemed "secret" to the point that civil society knew
little or nothing of what was developed in the Palace of Justice.
At the same time as the Commission's works, many incidents darkened
the image of judicial power. Unfortunate events in the administration of
justice continued taking place. Finally, a scandal affected public opinion
as a result of shameful acts that all Peruvians can appreciate. In a street
fight, hired thugs from two separate factions took over the administration
of a television channel. This act took place as a result of individual judicial
decisions.
Weeks after these events took place, on July 28, 2003, the President of
the Republic, Alejandro Toledo, indicated in critical way in his National
Celebrations speech that he "did not notice any advance of judicial
reform." For that reason, he offered diverse legislative projects intended
to create a commission dedicated to the integral reform of the Judicial
Power.2" That is to say, President Toledo considered a reform "from
outside."
The reaction of the judicial power was immediate. That day, the
president of the Supreme Court entered the arena once again and expressed
his disagreement with the president of the Republic, declaring that "time
was not wasted and that they have been arduously working."2
Nevertheless, the results achieved by the activities of the judicial power
concerning the reform "from within" were not disseminated, and the
recommendations made by the thematic work groups were not put in
practice. The explanation for this inaction is simple: they did not have a
budget and the Ministry of Economy and Finance was not in the capacity
to offer the necessary economical resources.
In spite of the apparent opposition of the judiciai power, the executive
power continued its attempt to promote a reform "from outside." This
effort took shape months later with the support-by a parliamentary
majority-of the legislative power. A new law created the Special
Commission for the Integral Reform of the Administration of Justice
19. A term of three months from its installation was established. Administrative Resolution
of the Presidency of the Judicial Power, supra note 19, art. 2. The results of the thematic work
groups were made available for public Aug. 2003, available at http://www.pj.gob.pe/
Reestructuracion/documentos.htm.
20. See EL COMMERCIO, July 29, 2003, at A2-3.
21. Id.
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(Ceriajus). 22 According to Article 2, the Special Commission is composed
of top officials from the main state institutions, such as the judicial power
that presides over it, the national public prosecutor, the Constitutional
Court, the ombudsman, the Ministry of Justice, the Congress of the
Republic, and representatives of civil society chosen by the participant
institutions of the National Agreement Forum. 23 The aim of Ceriajus was
to design a comprehensive plan of reform that included the possibility of
proposing modifications to the constitutional and legal norms of the
judiciary, as well as, presenting proposals and immediate measures before
April 23, 2004.24 Ceriajus was organized into ten thematic work groups
made up of diverse authorities on the law. 25 These groups were formed in
order to facilitate the debate and the work of the Ceriajus plenary sessions
on essential subjects related to the reform.2 6
Once again, the reaction of the Supreme Court was immediate. A few
days after the promulgation of the law that created Ceriajus, by means of
Administrative Resolution of the Presidency of the Judicial Power 1912003-P-PJ, of October 22, 2003, the National Agreement for Justice was
established. The objectives were to promote the proposals of the
Commission of Magistrates for Judicial Reconstruction, to receive citizen
initiatives for the modernization of the judicial power and to create points
of consensus to propose judicial policies that would allow a real change of
justice in Peru. The National Agreement for Justice also intended to
establish the Social Pact for Justice. The Pact aimed to establish a farreaching plan ofjudicial policy (over twenty years). The plan was outlined
as a process that in coordination with the Forum of National Agreement
would generate a space for reflection and thematic discussion on the
judicial subject would be in agreement with the Twenty-eighth State
National Agreement Policy called "Full Compliance with the Constitution
and Human Rights, and Access to Justice and Judicial Independence. '27
22. Law 28083 (2003) (Peru).
23. Law 28083 art. 2 (2003).
24. Specifically, the mission of the Ceriajus consists of proposing a national plan for the
Integral Reformation of the System of Justice that harnesses and coordinates the sectorial efforts
of each organization that forms the justice system. The plan seeks to guarantee the institutional
autonomy and prioritization of an approach that guarantees the protection of citizens' rights and
helps the social and economic development of the country. For an account of the points of view in
relation to the origins of the Ceriajus. See Abraham Siles Vallejos, La ley de Ceriajus: Acuerdo
o Disenso parala Reforma de la Justicia?[The Law of Ceriajus:Agreement or Dissentfor the
Reform of the Justice?], 68 CONSORCIO JUSTICIA VIVA (2003).
25. Notice of the Creation of Thematic Work Groups, Ninth Plenary Session of the Ceriajus
(Dec. 30, 2003), available at http://www.pj.gob.pe/CERIAJUS/Noticias.htm.
26. Id.
27. See ACUERDO NACIONAL [National Agreement], SECRETARIA TECNICA DEL ACUERDO
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These activities would be led by a distinguished group ofjurists who form
the Impulse Group, establishing a means for personalities "from outside"
the judicial power to participate "from within."
In October 2003, there were three forums for the debate of the reform
of justice administration in Peru. On one hand were the efforts "from
within" promoted by the judicial power through its judges. On the other
hand was Ceriajus, which was established as a mechanism "from outside"
but included the judicial power. Finally, there was the Impulse Group of
the National Justice Agreement, which was a mixed forum created within
the judicial power but made up of by persons unrelated to the judiciary.
This panorama was somewhat confusing because apparently there
would be three courts of deliberation and proposals. Nevertheless, it
incorporated all the actors and interested parties in promoting a suitable
judicial system. Therefore, the well-known confrontation between the
judicial power and the executive and legislative authorities regarding the
reform plans adjusted itself gradually. For example, on the day in which
the Ceriajus was incorporated, the president of the Supreme Court put
aside apparent disagreements and clearly proposed "let us leave aside
quick criticisms, the skepticism regarding change, as well as everything
that divides us, to sit together and to discuss in a open and responsible way
the comprehensive plans for reform that we are going to create."28
Doctor Sivina's message emphasized a firm decision to marginalize
disagreements and to focus on Peru's judicial reform. Obviously, the
process would be the subject of controversies and conflicting opinions, but
the reform would be developed.
The central question which we must consider is what is final objective
of the reform? That is to say, what is it that we want to achieve? Diverse
and noted people have given their opinions on this subject. They have
claimed that one goal is to avoid corruption. Other people say that the
objective is to make procedures faster. Many indicate that it should aim to
establish independence. Others say that it is necessary to attract high-level
professionals. In this sense, diverse actions have been proposed, such as
the modification of decisions, even constitutional, that deal with the
structure of the judiciary or with judicial procedure. Also, it has been
indicated that the objective is to guarantee the tenure and competitive
salaries of judges. In the same way, it has been suggested that judges
should be educated as part of the reform in order to improve the quality of

at 45, July 22, 2002.
28. See Alfredo Villavicencio, Ceriajus: iserd posible vencer la maldici6n nacionalde la
historia de nunca empezar?, 159 REVISTA 7 (2003), available at http://www.idl.org.pe/idlrev/
revistas/159/159CERIAJUS.pdf.

NACIONAL,
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decisions. It is also highlighted that it is important to have information
technology and computerized systems to improve the tracking of cases. All
of these diverse objectives and mechanisms exist to comprehensively
reform the judicial administration. All are important, and they are
interrelated. Nevertheless, it is very important to identify an objective and
activity that combine, offer coherence, and serve as a thread.
In this sense, this Essay takes as a starting point the hypothesis that the
indicated objectives, despite their importance, are secondary to the true
objective of the reform: to offer legal stability.
That is to say, the central objective of the reform aims to generate legal
stability in Peru. This can be obtained by making the decision-making
process predictable and it starts by means of the mechanism of the binding
precedent. This is what is known in Anglo-Saxon law as the principle stare
decisis et non quiets movere (Stare Decisis).
It is necessary to indicate that in a country with limited resources and
clear budgetary limitations, it becomes indispensable to identify an area of
the law or the judicial activity in which-at a first moment-the binding
precedents are put in application. For this purpose, the commercial area,
that in which the commercial interchanges are generated, would be the first
priority in the effort to generate precedent. To the extent that the solution
of controversies is predictable, it will generate legal stability. Greater legal
stability will support a more stable economy that will result in a better
climate for investment and in the possibility of generating more resources
for the national budget, which will enable more resources for the judicial
branch. The incorporation of binding precedent into the framework of the
Supreme Court could be the beginning of a virtuous circle that would yield
positive results to the system.
II. INTERCHANGE: THE CLASSIC MOTOR OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
The economic growth of a nation can be explained by many
determinants. Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that its main impulse
mechanism is the existence of a vibrant market, characterized by the
progressive multiplication of voluntary interchanges of goods between
individuals.29

29. See George L. Priest, Pobreza,Desigualdady los Simples Principiosdel Desarrollo
Econ6mico [Poverty, Inequality and the Simple Principlesof the Economic Development], 45
THEMiS LAW MAG. 187, 189-90 (2000). For example, Priest indicates five determinants for the
economic development: the discovery of natural resources; the technological and organizational
innovation that derives in one more a more efficient administration of the social resources; an
increase of the performance level of the economic actors; the increase of the value of the human
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Individuals voluntarily decide to exchange goods because both hope to
benefit from the interchange. In voluntary transactions, all the involved
parties end up winning. All of them, to a certain extent, increase their level
of well-being when giving a good in exchange for another which is more
valuable to them.
The existence of voluntary exchanges also generates social benefits
beyond the people that are directly involved. First, if an individual knows
that he can win with the exchange of a certain good, he will have an
incentive to invest in its production, which often will mean the creation of
new jobs.30 Secondly, in a developed market, individuals can concentrate
on producing the kind of good for which they have greater aptitude, while
they can obtain the goods they need by means of exchanges. This
generates the division of work and the specialization among individuals,
which allows for a more efficient organization of production.31 Thirdly,
because of the possibility of obtaining benefits from the exchange of
goods, individuals have incentives to invest resources in human capital,
technological innovation, organizational innovation, and in the discovery
of new natural resources.32 All of these factors positively affect society.33
Finally, people who benefit from an interchange have a greater level of
wealth, which generates a greater capacity of consumption. A greater
capacity for consumption increases demand, which creates new jobs and
the possibility of all the individuals of carrying out new exchanges.
Thus, exchanges have a multiplying effect on wealth. For this reason,
their promotion must be the central objective of any economic system and
the judicial power should play an important role in that. Exchanges by
definition always generate conflicts (technical orjudicial) and conflicts are
solved by rules. If the rules of the game are not established properly and
are not predictable, it is logical to suppose that the transactions will be
subject to instability or a lack of security. For that reason, if a predictable
judiciary does not exist, it is reasonable to presume that it will cause
commercial disruptions.

capital; and, the interchange between individuals. As it is observed in this section, the last factor
does not have an isolated repercussion in the economic development. It also positively affects the
other factors identified by the author.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. (showing that the interchange between individuals affects and positively
stimulates the other factors indicated by Priest).
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III. THE COSTS OF EXCHANGE
It has been said that the more business activity in a society, the greater
its level of development and economic growth. Nevertheless, business
transactions generate a series of costs.
First, there are costs to determine the benefit that will be obtained by
the acquisition of a good. For example, when a person wants to buy an
automobile, he or she invests time and money in finding out its specific
characteristics, cost of maintenance, and level of comfort. Second, there
are costs to identify the opposite party with whom the exchange will be
carried out. If a person wants to sell real estate, it is necessary to place an
advertisement in the newspaper or to hire a real estate agent. Third, there
are costs related to the negotiation of the terms of the desired agreement.
The parties usually invest time and effort to reach agreement on the details
of the contract. The negotiations often include the cost of lawyers,
valuation experts, technicians and auditors. Finally, there is the cost of
assuring that the other party fulfills their side of the agreement.34
In the same way, when a time-dependent installment contract is entered
into, each one of the parties expects that his counterpart will fulfill their
committment in the most efficient way possible. It is possible that one
would have to force the other party to fulfill their commitment, incurring
various types of costs.35 Thus, the possibility of incurring monitoring costs
exists. For example, costs could include personal verification that the agent
does his work, hiring a watchman to do so, installing a complicated and
onerous system of monitoring, etcetera. Lamentably, the monitoring costs,
especially in complex operations, are usually expensive.36
Another potential cost that may be incurred is designing a contract that
creates incentives for the agent to fulfill his or her duties. For example, in
a brokerage contract, it is possible to offer the agent a commission on a
successful sale or by the number of transactions made. Only the talent of
individuals limits the mechanisms that can be created to stimulate those
individuals to fulfill their part of a contract. Nevertheless, all these
mechanisms are expensive. In this way, making sure that a contract is

34. For example, the costs of assuring contract fulfillment when the benefits are deferred to
a later date. When the benefit of a contract is realized simultaneously with its signing, it is not
necessary to incur the costs of assuring the fulfillment because both parties know that if they do not
fulfill their side of the agreement then the other will not perform.
35. See Eric Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law
School, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 92 (2000), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=204872.
36. This is especially true because usually they involve new contracts (to contract watchmen,
for example) where new costs will be incurred to assure his fulfillment.
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fulfilled can be tremendously onerous. The cost of assuring the fulfillment
of the agreement often turns out to be greater than the expected benefit
from the transaction. It is important to remember that voluntary exchanges
take place because individuals expect to obtain benefits.
People engage in transactions because they assume that the costs,
which they will incur, will be smaller than the benefits they hope to obtain.
Therefore, the existence of relatively low transaction costs is an
indispensable element for the transaction to take place. Taking the
previous examples as a base, the judicial power has a very important role
to fulfill its efficiency can generate an increase or reduction in transaction
costs. If the judiciary is predictable, we can assume that the costs, which
the parts will have to incur will be smaller. In the opposite sense, the lack
of predictability not only increases costs, but also, makes them uncertain.

IV. THE PURPOSE OF INSTITUTIONS
The previous section illustrated how transactions impose a series of
costs. In the next paragraphs, we will concentrate on costs related to the
difficulty of determining whether a contract was fulfilled and,
consequently, to predict if the agreement will generate the expected
benefits.
The main contribution of the New Institutional Economy3 7 is that it has
indicated that the reasons why some markets grow and their nations
become developed are the institutions that arise within them. Institutions
are the rules aimed to reduce uncertainty in society by establishing stable
structures that reduce the cost of commercial transactions.3 8
Institutions, according to this school, can be formal or informal.3 9 All
of them have some type of relation to the existence of uncertainty in
contractual performance.40 When this Essay refers to formal institutions,
it is referring mainly to institutions developed by the State itself, such as
law or the judiciary. These formal institutions' main objective is to assure

37. See

DOUGLAS

NORTH,

INSTITUCIONES,

CAMBIO

INSTITUCIONAL

Y

DESEMPENO

(Spanish
edition published by Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, Mexico D.F.) (1989); David Hughest et al., Do
Quasi Markets Evolve? InstitutionalAnalysis and the NHS, 21 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 259 (1997);
Ha-Joon Chang, Breaking the Mould: An InstitutionalistPoliticalEconomy Alternative to the
NeoliberalTheory of the Market andthe State, in SOCIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
PAPER NUMBER 6 (200 1).
38. Christel Lane, The Social Regulation of Inter-firm Relations in Britain and Germany:
Market Rules, Legal Norms and Technical Standards, 21 CAMBRIDGE. J. ECON. 197 (1997).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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individuals that the State will perform under the contracts they sign. In this
way, these institutions reduce costs by creating ways to ensure that
contractual counterparts fulfill their obligations. Thus, the costs of entering
into contracts are diminished and more contracts are created. As a
consequence, society will reach greater wealth and development.
On the other hand, informal institutions are, among other things, social
customs or agreements. In a society where individuals tend to fulfill
contracts, where close personal relations between retailers exist, where
reputation has a great value, or where trade union agreements exist that
sanction those who fail to fulfill contracts, the costs of engaging in
commerce are reduced substantially. This is because it becomes simpler
to predict the success of the operation.
Normally, formal and informal institutions affect the fulfillment of
contracts. A comparative study of German and English companies made
by the Economic and Social Research Council of the University of
Cambridge determined that in the German Federal Republic, the enterprise
community has developed a series of self-regulations on relationships
between companies, technical fulfillment of agreements, and technical
standards that have remarkably elevated the level of confidence in the
success of transactions. This increase of predictability translates into a
greater number of contracts between companies and in the establishment
of more solid and durable relationships. Also, they were able to determine
that in the United Kingdom there is less integration of the entrepreneurial
community, more individualistic proceedings and lower self-regulation.
This resulted in higher costs for establishing commercial relationships.4'
Another study made by the same institution found that of a group of
German, English, and Italian companies, almost 100% used methods in
addition to the legal system to assure the performance of signed
agreements.4 2 In fact, 70% of the polled companies indicated that one of
the factors that made them trust the fulfillment of their counterparts' duties
was the existence of long term relationships and previous experiences with
satisfactory endings.4 3
Even though it is rare to find companies that use only the legal
contractual system as the mechanism to reduce risk in their operations,
companies in the three countries studied indicated that the legal system is
a central mechanism to obtain confidence in the fulfillment of

41. Id.
42. Brendan Burchell & Frank Wilkinson, Trust, Business Relationshipsand the Contractual
Environment, 21 CAMBRIDGE. J. ECON. 217 (1997).

43. Id.
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agreements.' Also, in a survey by the World Bank of 3,600 companies in
sixty-nine countries, more than 70% indicated that an unpredictable
judicial power was a great problem for their commercial operations.45
Again, the predictability of the judiciary is central to the consolidation of
commercial exchange.
The reason that formal institutions are important to companies that
operate in large economies is simple. To have informal institutions as the
only mechanisms to generate confidence in the fulfillment of contracts
implies a series of costs. Long-term relationships take time and effort.
Also, restricting commercial relationships only to individuals of a wellknown reputation considerably limits business opportunities. Finally,
putting faith in private conflict resolution institutions can be impractical
due to restricted coercive capacity. Also, due to administrative costs,
private conflict resolution only can be used by companies or people that
can afford it. Big companies in developed countries (like the ones
mentioned in the study) usually participate in impersonal businesses with
a multiplicity of individuals of different localities and nationalities. They
are also involved in businesses that need rapid establishment of
commercial relationships. Informal institutions usually are insufficient in
large and vertiginous economies.
In conclusion, small markets are usually characterized by the
supremacy of informal institutions. These are societies where service is
customized, production is on a small scale, repeated relationships are used,
cultural homogeneity exists and commerce is conducted on a local scale.46
In contrast, formal institutions such as the legal framework and the judicial
branch are important within developed economies. The operation of these
formal institutions encourages predictable results of contracts. In fact, as
Douglas North indicates, the formal rules can complement the
effectiveness of informal institutions by reducing the costs of monitoring,
forcing specific performance, and allowing for more complex
transactions.47

44. See id. at 223.
45. Richard Messick, JudicialReform andEconomic Development: A Survey of the Issues,
14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999).

46. See NORTH, supra note 39, at 52-53.
47. See id. at 66.
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V. THE IMPACT OF PERUVIAN JUDICIAL POWER ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

If formal institutions such as the judicial power do not reduce the costs
of assuring the fulfillment of contracts and, therefore, do not offer
predictability for economic activity, it will not be possible to reach the
desired level economic development. In fact, one of the accomplishments
of the New Institutional Economy has been to determine that the most
important source of underdevelopment in the third world is the incapacity
48
of societies to achieve effective contract enforcement at low cost.
The World Development Report 2000/2001, created by the World
Bank, exposed the relationship between the effective establishment of
justice and better general economic results. 49 This report found a
relationship between an indicator of legal status and GNP per capita in 166
countries in 1997 and 1998. The index highlights "the market mechanisms
depend on credible threats of sanction as a result of breaking existing
contractual obligations, endorsed by expeditious mechanisms to solve the
differences and to demand the performance of contracts. The lack of those
dissuasive mechanisms can increase the costs of economic transaction
activities."5
The same institution made another investigation, this time using a
sample of 3,800 companies in seventy-three countries, which determined
a lack of predictability in legal rules and the performance of the
institutions has a negative impact on investment decisions.51 The economic
growth of countries declines when the State offers no security on contracts
performance.
With this research in mind, it is opportune to ask how the judicial
branch influences the economic development of Peru. According to a
survey of the Instituto Apoyo, 80.8% of micro and small entrepreneurs
recognized the necessity of an institution that helped them to solve
conflicts with other individuals.52 Nevertheless, only 6.6% of them
reported that they had turned to the judicial power to solve these disputes
in the previous six months.5 3 The most evident reason for this behavior
48. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING POVERTY 102-03
(2001).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Aymo Brunetti et al., Credibility Rules and Economic Growth: Evidence from
Worldwide Survey of the PrivateSector, 12 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 353 (1998).
52. HUGO EYZAGUIRRE & CARLOS CALDER6N, PODER JUDICIAL Y MICRO Y PEQUE&A
EMPRESA. IMPACTO Y POSIBLES SOLUCIONES [The Judiciary and Micro and Small Enterprise:

Impact and Potential Solutions] 50 (Instituto Apoyo 2000).
53. Id. at 49.
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was that 21% of the entrepreneurs surveyed consider the judicial branch's
performance to be very bad, 41.2% considered it bad, 18.6% considered
it regular, and only 6% thought that it offered good services.54 In summary,
the range of negative grades given by the people surveyed was 93.4%.
Also, 80% of micro and small entrepreneurs interviewed describe the
judicial branch as slow, expensive, and biased. In a similar survey, 70%
of medium and big business owners had similar opinions regarding the
judiciary.55
The previous results are not surprising if we considere that during the
last fifteen years, citizens gave 70% to 80% rates of disapproval and
distrust of the judiciary.56 Other studies confirm this assessment.
According to an investigation made by the group of public opinion of the
University of Lima at the request of ProJusticia, using a sample of
seventy-one managers of companies in Lima, 84.5% of them had little
confidence in the Supreme Court, 90.2% had little confidence in the
Superior Court, 64.8% had little confidence in specialized courts, and
33.8% indicated that they have no confidence in the courts at all.
Because the formal institutions do not work properly, it becomes
tremendously expensive for companies that conduct large transactions to
operate in Peru. Also, micro and small companies only count on the
support of informal institutions to reduce the costs of ensuring the
effectiveness of contracts.
In a survey of small companies, 48% indicated that the most used
mechanism to reduce the risk of breach was working with known clients
and suppliers, while 11% indicated that the main mechanism they used
was to sign contracts with recognized experienced retailers. 57 The
dependency on these mechanisms is so high that 30% of micro and small
companies surveyed indicated that they would not change their trusted
supplier even if offered cheaper prices by others and 48% would demand
at least a 25% discount to accept a new supplier. The numbers are similar
with medium and large companies. A survey made by the World Bank in
our country determined that a third of the industrialists would not change
their supplier to a cheaper one due to fear of breach of contract. 8
Unlike developed countries, where formal and informal institutions
offer support regarding contracts, in Peru, the majority of industrialists use
54. Id. at 53.
55. Id. at 54.
56. See COMISION

ANDINA DE JURISTAS [ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS], ACCESO A LA
JUSTICIA Y DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO [COMMUNITY ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND DEFENSE] 167 (Lima

2001).
57. See EYZAGUIRRE & CALDERON, supra note 54, at 58.

58. See Messick, supra note 47, at 124.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss4/3

16

Canseco and Pasquel: Stare Decisis, Commercial Exchanges and Predictability: A Proposa
STARE DECISIS, COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES AND PREDICTABILITY

almost exclusively informal institutions. This shows that we have a
relatively primitive economy with a trade unionist nature and based on
personal ties. It is a fact that the lack of predictability of the judicial branch
exists to the detriment of modernity.
In addition, in Peru, the judiciary creates uncertainty regarding
contracts and its incoherence negatively affects the little certainty that the
informal institutions create. Due to the incoherence of ruling decisions that
exist in Peru's system, individuals are not able to comprehend the
reasoning of laws regarding contracts. Peru not only has a slow,
inefficient, and corrupt system of justice, but the courts are also
unpredictable due to the lack of coherence in the national jurisprudence.
Thus, thanks to the judicial branch, Peru's contractual system does not
offer minimal predictability regarding the compliance of the involved
parties in a contract. This tremendously elevates the costs of economic
exchanges and prevents the realization of many contracts. The
consequences of the described situations are extremely serious and they
explain to a great extent the low growth level of Peru's economy.5 9
A. CreditAccess
Because the judicial system does not allow parties to predictably know
what rules enforce contracts, financial organizations have a smaller
expected return rate in loan contracts. To compensate for the increased
risk, they must charge higher interest rates, which limits the credit access
of many companies that operate in Peru. Empirical studies of American
and European markets demonstrate that the disincentives to investment
generated by low predictability on profit are substantially greater in
industries dominated by small companies. The apparent reason is that
while great companies often finance their own projects by themselves
(using its patrimony or by means of the stock market), small companies
usually need external financing.6" This is particularly serious in a country
like Peru, where the market mainly consists of micro and small business.6

59. Consequences of the defective operation of the formal institutions are not new thing in
Peru, they were studied in the 1980s by Hernando de Soto and the Institute Freedom and
Democracy (Instituto Libertad y Democracia/ILD). See HERNANDO DE SOTO, EL OTRO SENDERO
[The Other Path] (Instituto Libertad y Democracia 1987).
60. Vivek Ghosal & Prakash Loungani, The DifferentialImpact ofUncertaintyon Investment
in Small and Large Businesses, 82 REv. ECON. & STAT. 338 (2000).
61. A study conducted by the Instituto Apoyo found that 65% of micro and small businesses
did not seek bank loans because they did not have the required guarantees or because of the very
high interests rate. See EYZAGUIRRE & CALDER6N, supra note 54, at 74.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

17

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 3
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Vol. 20

B. Vertical Integration
Because the binding execution of contracts signed between suppliers
and distributors is unpredictable, companies tend to integrate themselves
vertically in order to make sure that breach will not exist. This kind of
organization is often inefficient because the costs oftransaction within one
company are higher than the costs of operating in a market where legal
security exists. This diminishes the growth and the organizational
effectiveness of companies.62
C. EnterpriseAssociations
The theory of common facilities states that competing companies can
reduce to their costs by forming associations or partnerships.63 For
example, they can share the costs of carrying out investigations importing
technology, or buying supplies.
According to the Institute Support, only 2% of micro and small
industrialists indicated they have used the modality of joint purchase of
supplies or bags of acquisitions, because they fear problems with payment
or delivery. Furthermore, only 17% indicated that they associated with
others to satisfy demand peaks, because they fear later conflicts in the
establishment of agreement. 64
D. InternationalTrade Reduction
The deficiencies of the judicial power not only affect the development
of local industry, but also, international trade. Local industries usually
have easier access to informal institutions, and they know what retailers
have good reputation. In addition, they probably have established long
time commercial relations. Local business have the possibility of
belonging to local unions and they know the customs and uses of the
country. Foreign companies usually do not have these advantages, which
is why economically developed countries do more business with other
economically developed countries than with third-world countries.65 Thirdworld countries do not offer to foreign companies the mechanisms to
lower the costs related to international exchanges. In fact, it has been
determined that an increase of 10% in the transparency and impartiality

62. See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 85-102 (1985);
see also RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, THE LAW 42-43 (1990).
63. See EYZAGUIRRE & CALDERON, supra note 54, at 72-73.
64. Id.
65. James Anderson & Douglas Marcouller, Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: an
EmpiricalInvestigation, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 342 (2002).
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index of the judicial system of a country results in an increase in imports
by 5%. Also, it has been calculated that if the institutional quality indices
of Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia or Mexico were the same as
those of the European Union, the international trade of these nations would
expand in 30%.66
In Peru, the judicial branch is inefficient, contradictory, and
unpredictable. For that reason, it does not assure individuals that the
contractual terms will be respected, nor allow them to know the legal rules
applicable beforehand. Thus, it increases the costs and lowers the amount
of economic interchanges, reducing the economic development of Peru.
The judicial branch to which parties will turn in order to solve their
controversies, has a role to fulfill. It will do it by making the system
predictable. This may be obtained through the putting into practice the
principle of Stare Decisis.
VI. STARE DECISIS

A. HistoricalDevelopment
One of the most important institutions of the Anglo-Saxon common
law is Stare Decisis. Stare Decisis is a Latin expression that literally means
' This phrase,
"keep to the determined decision and maintain the calm."67
transferred to colloquial Peru, could be translated today as "you already
know what I think, you do not rock the boat," because it aims to promote
calm in law. In common law, it is also related to expressions such as
"stand by decided," "to uphold precedents" and "to maintain to former
68
adjudications.,
From its remote origins in Roman law, Stare Decisis appeared as a
legal principle intended to prevent abuses by the kings, Roman consuls and
emperors by giving judges the ability to avoid ad hoc decisions bent by the
influence of those in power. It was a mechanism of defense for the judicial
system by guaranteeing the independence of the judges. In the same way,
before Justinian, Stare Decisis allowed replacing the absence of law or,
being the case, the lack of precision of them, and in addition, it came to be
consecrated or recognized as a formal custom.

66. Id.
67. OSCAR RABASA, EL DERECHO ANGLOAMERICANO [The Anglo-American Rights] 30

(Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica 1944).
68. Id.
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In the United Kingdom, Stare Decisis developed in the form we know
today and then expanded to the United States and other countries with the
same legal tradition (British ex-colonies). The introduction of the principle
of Stare Decisis was not a product of the invasion of the Roman, the
Teutonic, and Saxon tribes. This institution was established in England in
1066 with the invasion of French Normans that brought with them Roman
based law, which was adapted and gradually fused with the existing
consuetudinary system of the time.
Unlike mainland Europe, where the feudal regime was relatively weak,
and the authority of the king was omnipotent, in medieval England, the
system of land possession before the Norman invasion reinforced
feudalism and made it very powerful. Judges and courts depended on the
feudal lord and not on a symbolic central power. With the arrival of the
Normans, there was an introduction of a legal structure sustained in laws
and codes. Furthermore, there was an attempt to centralize the power (the
law is an expression of the central power). Nevertheless, the preeminence
of feudal lords forced the Norman kings to exert their power through a
Royal Council or curia regis, which was a true state branch that acted in
representation of a weak monarch.
It is through the Royal Council that the English kings governed and this
Council controlled all the government functions (the Council was
composed of the most notable feudal lords). This was the beginning of the
division of powers concept that sustains the contemporary democratic
systems because the government functions were entrusted to the ministers
of the court rather than being concentrated in a single person. Also, the
legislative function was given to the parliament of the king.
The jurisdictional function was also delegated to three institutions: the
Court of King's Bench or the Council of the King to take care of
administrative matters; the Court of Common Pleas or Court of the
Ordinary Litigations to solve the civil controversies; and the Court of
Exchequer, that was instituted as the instance to solve tributary matters.
These three judicial institutions constitute the beginning of the
management system of justice of England and is the reason why they are
known as Courts.
These three courts:
were extended and multiplied later until completing the present
organization of the Judicial Branch of the British Empire, and were
originally the ones that turned through their resolutions the uses and
rudimentary customs of the feudalism and the primitive tribes
Saxons and Normans on the legal norms of all the kingdom, from
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where it really developed the body and structure of the AngloSaxon right denominated Common Law.69
In this context appears Stare Decisis because in a country in which the
right was fundamentally consuetudinary, it was necessary to establish a
mechanism that offered solidity and predictability in the legal system.
Furthermore, it kept the king, his ministers, or the parliament from using
their power against what in repeated occasions was considered just or
legal.
This can be done through obligatory jurisprudence, which instead of
being a decision with limited effects for the involved parts, generates
consequences for all society. Stare Decisis is, as it was indicated
previously, a shield against the political power besides being a deeply
democratic principle.
B. Definition and ConceptualFrame
Stare Decisis, or the binding force of the judicial precedent, supposes
that once a case has been resolved by means of a sentence, it settles down
an antecedent that in principle cannot vary later. The rule mandates that
the precedent must be obeyed when a controversy presents identical fact
and law matters. Its purpose is to maintain equilibrium in the balance of
justice in order to prevent ambiguity every time there is a new
interpretation from a judge. It assumes that the balance ofjustice inclines
by the weight of the facts and not by the capricious interpretation of the
judge. What is more, "once defined and declared solemnly the law in the
concrete case, what before was uncertain and perhaps indifferent, becomes
a norm and it is not in the will of a judge to scorn it or to modify it
according to his or her personal conceptions." 7 In sum, it aims to offer
legal security by means of a predictable legal system.
Stare Decisis has value in itself. It is fundamental for the judicial
system. To the extent that the precedents are based on substantiated and
reasoned decisions, not only will it marginalize secondary prejudice and
damages, it also will develop the law as expression of justice. By
definition, the decisions will be different from the policies because
decisions generally respond to diverse interests and do not necessarily aim
to be fair. In addition, to the extent that the precedents that create Stare
Decisis are inspired by previous decisions (ratifying them, distinguishing
them or modifying them), the publication for its reasoning creates

69. Id.
70. Id. at 548.
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transparency in the decision-making process, which consolidates legal
security.
This doctrine tends to confer great importance to the reasoning of the
decision, so it is possible that it will be considered as a law although taken
through a dictum or commentary. The decisive part of the sentence is
formally the only one that has law rank and that normally is applied only
in a particular case.
In the sense that justice must be administered in an equitable way, it is
necessary to resolve analogous cases in a similar way. As it was indicated
before, Stare Decisis mandates that a judicial decision must follow the
previous sentence unless it is distinguished or overruled.
C. Central Values
The central values of Stare Decisis are stability, certainty,
predictability, consistency, and respect for authority. By definition,
precedents generate stability in the legal system and the economy because
they confer certainty. Certainty promotes legal stability because the
economic actors and civil society as a whole will be able to predict the
result of any controversy. The point is to let the parties know what to
expect and to compel consistent decisions.
These values are important to the judiciary's role in conflict resolution
and, more importantly, in the creation of law. This is what confers the
judiciary the category of "power" because its role changes from "last
possibility" to a true "last instance" that invests it with moral authority and
effective power.
D. Importance of the PublicationofJudgments
Judicial decisions must be published, because publishing them
increases predictability. In fact, even if it no more than recounts the logic
of a particular case, publication is beneficial because it shows how the law
is applied to different facts. Therefore, the publication ofjudgments offers
certainty by increasing the accumulation of precedents. In effect, the
weight of precedent on a point of law makes that point more solid and
makes it much more difficult for its interpretation be substituted in a
capricious manner. A great number of affirmations of a certain precedent
allow lawyers to depend on the stability of a legal doctrine with greater
confidence.
Expressed in another way, a court may ignore one inconvenient
precedent, but it cannot do so if a dozen exist. Secondly, posterior
casuistry helps "confirm" precedent as well as allowing the dark points to
be clarified. Thirdly, an increasing accumulation of apparently routine
decisions on a particular point of law can suggest to judges, lawyers and
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academics that a problem is arising in the market. This can lead to calls for
regulatory reform or to settle a controversial precedent. Finally,
publication promotes an important institutional objective: to maintain the
appearance thatjustice is being carried out. Publication constitutes a signal
to litigants, civil society and the business community that nothing is
happening in secret and that the work quality is subject to public scrutiny.
Stare Decisis, as binding precedent or compulsive jurisprudential
doctrine, makes publication mandatory. This circumstance results in a
quality control mechanism because it allows any conceptual errors to be
discussed and corrected later. In effect, binding precedent, as previously
indicated, becomes a sort of "law" or "quasi-legislative ruling" normally
issued by the judicial community. Unlike the United States or other
common law countries, where decisions of the highest courts result from
publicized hearings, in Peru, the judgments of the Supreme Court are only
known by the parties to a controversy. This is pernicious to the
development of the rule of law in general and promotes corruption.
E. Consistency of Quality
In this same line of thought, Stare Decisis gives incentives for the
superior application of legal reasoning. Today, it has been confirmed that
the reasoning behind the decisions in Peru leaves much to be desired,
despite efforts to increase the logical reasoning of decisions.
Stare Decisis, or binding Supreme Court precedent, compels judges to
maintain the same standard of quality. It helps the effort by elevating the
effectiveness of judicial work in general and of decisions individually.
This work, obviously, will be supported by continued analysis by the legal
community and by society.
F. Reduction in Litigation
The precedents generated by Stare Decisis will not be affected by the
proliferation of litigation. The performance of judicial administration is
affected by the increase in population, the increase in legislation and other
legal dispositions, which are promulgated (the tendency towards overregulation), the situation in which laws are of poor quality and require
interpretation, and the considerable increase in commercial transactions
and a greater incidence of interpersonal conflicts. All of these factors
result in an increase in use of judicial procedures that creates a serious
problem for which Stare Decisis offers an effective alternative solution.
This is because judges will know in advance how similar cases should be
resolved, which will root out litigation that is propelled by the will of the
lawyers and not by the parties or the justice of the cause. Finally, Stare
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Decisis will resolve growing caseloads with greater rapidity because it will
avoid appeals in cases with repetitive legal situations.
G. Lawyer Behavior and Consequencesfor Parties
Once a judicial decision is published, it is supposed to create a citing
obligation on the part of lawyers. It is not only inadequate but also
unethical for a lawyer to not perform this duty by informing the client of
the existence of a precedent binding to the case. A lawyer is obligated to
advise his client of the existence of a precedent that affects their interests
and of the way he interprets it. This situation has a double effect. On the
one hand, it imposes ethical standards on the development of the
profession. On the other hand, it compels improvement in the technical
level of the profession because it forces constant update and analysis.
When a court or a tribunal initiates the decision-making process and
finally issues an opinion, the parties to the action have a reasonable
expectation that, faced with similar cases in the future, the court will
process them in the same way. Justice does not only mean that a particular
case will be solved in a just way, but also that the parties know how
similar cases will be decided in the future. This promotes credibility,
respect and confidence in the system. Even if a decision or the precedent
is considered mistaken or erroneous, the psychological effects are
attenuated by the knowledge that other cases will be treated in the same
way.
H. Nonexistence of Stare Decisis
The advantages of Stare Decisis are theoretical in our country because
precedents are irrelevant, and even the review of previous decisions
(understood as antecedents or review of judgments) is practically
nonexistent. As a result, the effectiveness of the judicial system is
decreased considerably. The nonexistence of Stare Decisis generates
chaos. It takes away, even from the more experienced lawyers, the ability
to predict with any degree of certainty the possible result of litigation. It
inevitably elevates the costs of transactions and reduces the legitimacy of
the system. There is an "equation of justice" that is expressed in the
following way: with greater predictability, less cost and more legitimacy;
with lower predictability, greater costs and less legitimacy.
The absence of Stare Decisis generates random and arbitrary results
that cause the Superior Courts and the Supreme Court to be overloaded by
appeals. Conversely, the publication of the results of binding precedents,
that in Peru would be expressed by means of plenary sessions, would
allow inferior courts and litigants to have access to precedents that would
improve the speed and the quality of the decision-making process. In
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addition, potential litigants would know whether it would be worth the
trouble to initiate an action and what the possibilities of success would be.
On the other hand, the absence of Stare Decisis and the non-publication
of binding precedents affect predictability from two perspectives. In the
first place, it relieves the judicial decision of the responsibility to reason
and to justify a point of view in an integral way. Secondly, the increase in
the number of decisions that take place as a result of the automatization of
the administration ofjustice becomes less important to the formation and
consolidation of the law. That is to say, legal stability is brought about not
by quantity but by quality.
I. Antecedents in Peru
One example of Stare Decisis being implemented in Peru is in the
Peruvian Institute of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Defense
(Indecopi). In accordance with Article 43 of Legislative Decree 807, the
Indecopi Court has the potential to establish binding precedents. 7' The
precedents of the Indecopi courtrooms represent the incorporation and
adaptation of the Stare Decisis of Anglo-Saxon law into Peruvian reality.
In effect, this court has the capacity to adopt interpretative criteria around
a norm and this becomes obligatory for the commissions or offices of that
institution. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon system, in which all judgments of the
higher courts constitute precedent, in Indecopi only those decisions that
have explicitly been declared as such have these characteristics. This is an
adaptation of the Roman system to the Anglo-Saxon.
The implementation of Stare Decisis has allowed Indecopi to avoid an
overload of cases and capricious interpretations. It is possible that the
litigants and the academic sector may not share the same opinion of the
precedents. Nevertheless, no one doubts the excellent reasoning that
characterizes them. Proof of this is that less than 1% of the cases that are
aired before the institution appear before the judicial branch in an
administrative appeal.
Also, as precedents have been published, and academia has been able
to comment on them intensely, which increased the quality of their
interpretation and even led to their modification over the course of years.
A similar system is seen at the level of the Constitutional Court and the
Tax Court. The difference between these courts and those of Indecopi are
that their precedents are not specifically declared. Nevertheless, the parties
recite and those courts permanently incorporate the rulings of previous

71. Law on the Faculties, Norms and Organization of the INDECOPI, Legislative Decree No.
807, tit. VII, art. 43.
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decisions. This has resulted in an important level of predictability within
the framework of constitutional and taxation controversies, respectively.
However, the decisions of the Tax Court and Indecopi are appealable to
the judicial branch, so that the predictability that is generated
administratively is diluted because the Peruvian judicial branch does not
apply the system of precedents.
A unique characteristic of Peruvian law that has passed unnoticed in
spite of the genius of its invention is that Peru is probably one of the few
Roman tradition countries in the world that has specifically incorporated
the principle of Stare Decisis in its judicial system. The 1991 Code of Civil
Procedure contains a rule that incorporates Stare Decisis. This Peruvian
law is extremely interesting because it embodies principles and
characteristics that have been reviewed elsewhere in this work. Article 400
of the Code allows, when there are questions with respect to the nature of
a decision to be made and the court requests, justices to meet in open court
to discuss the questions and solve them. The decision that is made by
absolute majority of the attendees to the plenary session constitutes
judicial doctrine and binds the jurisdictional organs of the State, until
modified by another plenary session. If the lawyers made oral argument
at the hearing of the case, this will be cited to the plenary session. A
plenary session will be mandatory when it is known that another court is
interpreting or applying law to a specific issue. The complete text of all the
casatorias judgments and the resolutions that decide the issue untriable are
published mandatorily in the official newspaper, although they do not
establish judicial doctrine. The publication must be done within sixty days
of issuance.
Upon reading, one of the branches of the Supreme Court may request
what is called a "casatorio" plenary session to solve the controversy. This
will be done by a full bench, which means that the complete body of the
Supreme Court will participate in the decision. This is considered "judicial
doctrine" and becomes binding for this court and all the jurisdictional
organs of the state, which means that the decision will be permanent until
modified by another casatorio plenary session. Finally, the law mandates
that the decisions underlying the precedent are published. This converts
them into "quasi-laws."
The legislative adoption of the principle of Stare Decisis is most
important for Peruvian Law and judicial stability. However, although the
law has been effective for more than a decade, it has never been applied.
There has been no "plenary session" held pursuant to the law despite the
fact that the instrument had helped significantly with efforts at judicial
reform and would require a smaller investment in terms of budget than
other reforms.
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The decision not to apply Article 400, which in principle could be
applied to criminal cases since the law does not say otherwise, can be
reversed. Furthermore, this law has been partially proposed as one of the
activities approved by the Commission of Magistrates for the
Reconstruction of the Judicial Power.7 2 Within the framework of the
thematic Ceriajus groups, a group has been established that refers to
"Predictability and
Precedent," which could adopt as a theme the subject
73
of Stare Decisis.
VII. OUR PROPOSAL
Within the framework of the process ofjudicial branch reform initiated
by the presidency of the Supreme Court (National Agreement for Justice)
and by the executive branch (Ceriajus), one of the main initiatives that
could be taken into consideration consists of generating procedures that
promote the predictability of judicial decisions.
There are many reasons why predictability is important for the reform
of the administration of justice, such as the credibility of the judicial
power, bringing the best lawyers into the judiciary, the fight against
corruption, the identification of ways to promote the development of
judges, and starting programs to increase computerization.
Judicial reform is not an end into itself. Therefore, it is important to
identify an objective that coagulates the diverse efforts within the
framework being developed by the National Agreement for Justice and
Ceriajus horizontally. For that reason, the search for legal stability as the
central objective of reform has connotations at the political, economic, and
social levels.
The political and social connotations do not require emphasis.
However, as far as economic concerns go, legal stability is not secured
only by means of the establishment of "contract laws" or by adding to the
constitution certain legal principles that permit the rules of trade to be
maintained without fluctuation.

72. Listing of the thematic work groups, available at http://www.pj.gob.pe/noticias/
noticias.asp?opcion=detalle&codigo=928.
73. For an analysis of the origins and reaches of Certiorari, see Edward A. Hartnett,
Questioning Certiorari:Some Reflexions Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1643 (2000); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1 (1983); Ira P. Robbins, Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Courtand the Rule of Four-Oris
it Five?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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Therefore, we plant the working hypothesis that legal stability, within
the framework ofjudicial reform, depends on the predictability ofjudicial
decisions. In the same sense, beginning with the premise that there are
limited resources for extensive reform-by definition, a long-term
project-its important to associate legal stability and predictability with
commercial subjects, or "commercial justice," from the start.
In effect, if judicial decisions in commercial disputes are predictable,
it will probably send the message to the national and international
community of investors that a stable business climate exists in Peru, which
in turn will legitimize the efforts of the judicial power to obtain a more
suitable budget. Then, if there is more stability, there will be more
domestic and foreign private investment; if there is more investment, there
will be more resources for the state treasury; if there are more resources,
the judicial power will be able to increase its budget, or in any case, its
needs will be legitimized.
It is difficult to determine what constitutes "commercial justice"
because civil law and commercial law are incompatible. Commercial
subjects are understood as, among others, the laws of securities,
specialized mercantile contracting or "modern contracts" (franchising,
factoring, know-how, technology transfers), antitrust regulation,
intellectual property, public contracting and privatizations, and bankruptcy
law.
The urgency for the development of activities in this sphere stems from
the need to create a more stable investment climate and to promote
competition. The slowness, corruption, and lack of predictability that
normally characterize the judicial power constitute an obstacle to the
attraction of capital, the promotion of commercial activity, and to
economic growth.
This Essay suggests the need to base case law in the principle of Stare
Decisis in order to complement and harness any advance in "commercial
justice." As it has been indicated, Stare Decisis means that the decisions
orjudgments of the Supreme Court of Justice-specifically adopted within
the framework of the plenary sessions-become binding precedent,
therefore, they are immediately to be observed and applied by the diverse
hierarchies of judicial administration.
The principle of Stare Decisis is necessarily complemented by the rule
of certiorari, which allows the Supreme Court of Justice to select the cases
that it considers important to consider. That is to say, by means of the filter
of certiorari, the Supreme Court selects the cases to be the object of
analysis or, in its case, merit the the summoning of a plenary session that
will produce a binding precedent. Nevertheless, certiorari can be
implemented later. This is as soon as an important number of precedents
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controlling fundamental issues of Peruvian law can be counted that will be,
obviously, a secondary effort.
VIII. CONTEXT OF PROPOSAL
The systemization of case law is an indispensable for the success of any
initiative intended to reinforce law in general and commercial law in
particular. The promotion of trade that would accompany the creation of
trade courts will be unattainable if judicial decisions are not predictable.
This can only be attained through the systemization of case law.
In effect, systemization will have positive repercussions in all aspects
of the judicial reform process, because the training of judges, legal
development, computerization, and efforts to promote ethical standards to
avoid corruption serve little purpose if the judiciary is allowed to interpret
the law in an arbitrary and contradictory way. It is a matter of unifying
criteria to make the system predictable and, therefore, to offer legal
stability.
The systemization of case law requires work in two specific and closely
related areas:
a) The processing and classification of judgments handed down by all
judicial bodies, which will allow the users of the system (judges,
lawyers and litigants) to know early on the concrete interpretation of
the law. This will have to be an ongoing job because it must be
updated. It is not a work of chronological counting, but of systemized
processing, which may be carried out by the judicial branch, but could
also be done by private companies, which would avoid large spending
on the task. In most countries of the world, case law is compiled and
archived by private companies competitively.
b) The implementation of plenary sessions of the Supreme Court under
Article 400 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with the purpose of
instituting "binding precedents" that contribute to the unification of
lines of interpretation. That is to say, it is a matter of using systems
similar to the ones adopted in the United Kingdom or by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the principle of Stare Decisis. This would
be one of the most important and innovative initiatives of judicial
branch reform and would mark a clear departure from previous efforts
on an international scale. In effect, a preliminary investigation of the
reform projects of the Judicial Power promoted by the World Bank, the
Inter-American Development Bank and the American Agency for
International Development (USAID) on a world-wide scale reveals that
the subject of Stare Decisis has not been considered.
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The implementation of Stare Decisis would make the judicial power of
Peru a member of the select group of countries (all of them developed) for
which binding precedent is a fundamental part of a legal system that
consists of laws adopted by the legislature and decrees and actions of the
executive that are interpreted in an obligatory way by the judiciary. This
is what is known as the "balance of powers" and it has allowed the judicial
power in developed countries to have relevance and importance as well as
prestige and independence.

IX. PROPOSAL JUSTIFICATION

The success of judicial systemization has a positive impact that is not
limited solely to one concrete aspect of the reform of justice but
reverberates throughout its themes.
A. Speed of the Administration ofJustice
Case law, in that it establishes uniform criteria of interpretation, not
only will increase predictability, but will become a disincentive for the
filing of complaints with a low probability of success. Nowadays, the
possibility of success generates over-expectations. With a system of
precedents, however, it is supposed that only those demands will appear
that have a reasonable possibility of success. This will precipitate a
decrease in the load of litigation because the judges will have fewer cases
to decide.
In the same way, the creation of criteria for uniform interpretation will
alleviate the work of judicial decision-making because it will be enough
to identify the line of case law that was followed in similar cases so it will
not be necessary to discuss larger questions of law.
A faster delivery of justice guarantees that the judicial branch in
general, and commercial justice individually, do not become repositories
of wasted capital expenditures. Also, it offers businesspeople the security
that conflicts within the system will be resolved in a brief and reasonable
time.
B. Control of Corruption
The level of confidence in a certain market depends on its actors' belief
that they compete under equal conditions. For that reason, the presence of

institutional corruption generates distrust in the investors and reduces
economic growth. As such, it is important that the judicial branch become
the leading institution in offering a transparent image. It should level the
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playing field by making sure that no actor is favored arbitrarily by state
organizations.
Nevertheless, at the present time, judges enjoy absolute discretion to
interpret the meaning of the law. It allows them to conceal cases of
corruption easily. Also, this situation frustrates the establishment of
objective standards that would expose cases in which a court does not
adhere to the law. Binding precedents can be seen as objective criteria that
determine when a magistrate departs from the correct interpretation of the
law, making control of corruption simpler. That is to say, the system of
precedents becomes the anticorruption mechanism ex ante by
antonomasia.
The existence of clear lines of case law also serves as a means of
reduction of corruption in those cases where it arises from private
initiatives. The reason is similar to the previous one: in a system of
binding precedents that reduce the scope of the judge's discretion,
individuals will find less opportunities to corrupt judicial civil employees.
C. Increase of Institutional Credibility
The existence of clear lines of case law would generate greater
confidence in the judicial system and portray an image of transparency and
impartiality, fundamental for the legitimacy of its decisions. Thus,
institutional credibility is increased as well as the level of public
confidence in the magistrates.
In addition, the existence of binding precedent would succeed in
eliminating the existence of contradictory judgments. This is particularly
important because their presence can mean a high political cost to judicial
institutions.
Currently, the public's unfavorable perception of the judicial power
prevents it from attracting top professionals. The increase of institutional
credibility would create the incentives necessary to attract experts of a
considerably higher level of education as civil employees that would
increase the quality of judgments and the service offered by the judicial
branch in general.
The increase of the judicial branch's credibility would translate into an
increase in the country's political stability. This, in turn, would attract
domestic and foreign investment because political instability is one of the
main factors contributing to Peru's risk indicators.
Any measure that is adopted in the process ofjudicial reform, including
the creation of commercial courts, would be considerably strengthened if
mechanisms to legitimize the institution before society are achieved
jointly.
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D. Clear Rules and Promotionof PrivateInvestment
By offering civil society clear and definitive criteria on how to interpret
law in specific cases; predictability would be generated in judges'
decisions. In turn, this will generate legal stability, which has positive
effects on the attraction of private investment in the country.
If the judicial power develops a policy of unification of case law,
especially in those areas in which greater interpretative differences exist,
the predictable application of a legal rule to an individual situation will
generate greater certainty among the users of the legal system and among
investors who could potentially use it.
Clearer legal rules would bring as a natural corollary the promotion of
domestic and foreign private investment, because the investor would have
a better capacity to measure risk. Greater levels of investment, in turn, will
be followed by an increase in employment levels, in the possibilities for
economic agents to develop bigger projects, and an increase in the
taxpaying capacity of businesses and individuals.

X. PROPOSAL IMPLEMENTATION

The initiative consists of implementing mechanisms that allow the
unification of precedential threads and give predictability to judicial
solutions. The aim of these mechanisms is to create a more diligent
process, diminishing the indices of corruption, increasing institutional
credibility and generating clear rules to promote private investment. Thus,
the goals pursued by the creation of commercial justice will be reinforced
and strengthened.
In this analysis, the system of certiorari should definitely be included,
because it allows the judicial branch to "select" those cases which it
considers important to make a statement and to establish a precedent.
Certiorari is the mechanism used by the Supreme Court to "select" those
cases that, due to their importance or impact on society, require an explicit
and unequivocal decision. In sum, the Supreme Court chooses certain
exemplary cases in order to establish a precedent that will have to be
followed by inferior courts. Certiorari and Stare Decisis are
complementary because the first allows the selection of the cases that will
be the objects of the second. Nevertheless, certiorari should be
implemented in the second part of the reform, as soon as there is a body
of binding precedent in the sphere of the plenary sessions that have
resolved the most common legal controversies. Suggested are these
activities, in this order:
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A. FunctionalOperatingStudy of the PeruvianLegal System
Beforehand, a report on the economic consequences of the current legal
system. In this way, the currently existing incentives of the justice system
in our country and those that would arise upon the implementation of Stare
Decisis in our country would be described. In addition, the manner in
which this institution has been historically developed in third-world
countries would be exposed. Finally, the impact that the systemization of
justice would have on the diverse parts of judicial reform could be
explained, with a particular emphasis on commercial justice.
B. OperatingStudy of the Rule of Certiorari
A report on the characteristics of the certiorari rule would be
conducted. The study would explain how the rule has been developed
historically in the United States, with particular emphasis on the argument
of the reduction of judicial case loads and on the rule's link to Stare
Decisis.
C. Study on the Use of Case Law by the Operatorsof the Legal System
This would establish to what extent judges and counsel invoke or use
case law as a means to permit them to determine the most suitable
interpretation of the law for a certain case. It would also determine the
possible sources available in Peru to inform oneself on points of case law.
Finally, the level of importance of case law to legal education would be
discerned.
D. Study on the Predictabilityof Existing Case Law Criteriafor
Commercial Matters
The existence of contradictions in the different lines of case law in the
most relevant areas (especially in commercial law) would be verified (as
far as empirically possible). Also, the commercial cases where existing
case law results in less predictability would be established. Finally, it
would be determined which of these areas creates a greater case load. With
this information, a work agenda for the jurisdictional plenary sessions
could be formed.
E. Elaborationof Rules for the Adoption of Binding Precedents
Regulations would be created that would serve as a framework to
determine the procedure to follow whenever the Supreme Court decides
to convene a plenary session. These regulations would create incentives
for the Supreme Court judges to systematically implement the adoption of
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binding precedents. The regulation would include elements of certiorari
with the goal of establishing a means of "selecting" cases.
F. PilotPlanfor Establishingthe FirstBinding Precedents
It would be important to advise the members of the Supreme Court in
two areas. The first is putting into practice the system of plenary sessions.
The second is the selection of the first binding precedents, assisting the
magistrates in the preparation of corresponding judgments. This is
fundamental because the credibility of the system depends on the high
standard for the decisions.
G. Creation of a System of Publicationof Precedent
The success of this system depends on the judges from lower courts
and the users of the judicial system having knowledge of each new binding
precedent. For that reason, inexpensive and efficient mechanisms to
disclose and to publish the precedents adopted in plenary sessions should
be established.
H. ConstitutionalReform
One alternative that could be considered consists of promoting a
constitutional reform that has as its object to incorporate the principle of
Stare Decisis in our Magna Carta. It would allow us to, at the outset, offer
the highest class of judiciary, as well as avoiding the possibility that the
principle could be eliminated by means of a simple modification of law.
Also, it would encourage the Supreme Court to go through with the
plenary sessions, which, as it has been indicated, have been avoided, even
though Article 400 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been effective for
more than a decade.
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